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INTRODUCTION

Asbestos litigation in California continues to grind along at a slow and
expensive pace. In the jurisdictions where most of the asbestos litigation is
concentrated-the Superior Courts of San Francisco, Alameda, Los Angeles,
and Orange counties-the courts have tried various approaches to managing
their asbestos dockets by coordinating and consolidating thousands of cases,
holding meetings with counsel to develop and implement customized case
management procedures, and investing hundreds of hours in case
management. Despite these valiant efforts by courts at the local level to
manage the litigation, asbestos cases still remain an enormous burden on the
California legal system. While some jurisdictions have been arguably more
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aggressive in their efforts to curtail the flood of asbestos litigation,'
California courts have yet to adopt some of the most significant recent
developments.2 With plaintiff firms from Texas and elsewhere opening
offices in California, there is no doubt that even more asbestos cases are on
their way to the state.
This Article examines several defining aspects of asbestos litigation in
California, both to assess the current state of the applicable law and to
evaluate what might be done to make the handling of these cases more
effective, efficient, and fair. Specifically, this Article will suggest:
*

using forum non conveniens motions to transfer cases to
appropriate jurisdictions

*

bringing back the "substantial" in the substantial factor test

"

adopting Daubert or other preliminary assessments for the
adequacy of the foundation for an expert's opinions and the
reliability of such testimony

*

educating the jury on the ramifications of joint liability to
ensure that the award reflects the respective fault assessed

*

ensuring fairness in the way in which settlement credits are
calculated for purposes of off-setting economic damages post
verdict

II. MANY ASBESTOS CASES BEING FILED IN CALIFORNIA SHOULD BE
TRANSFERRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Every year numerous asbestos-related personal injury or wrongful death
actions are filed in California despite the fact that the plaintiffs often have no
meaningful connection to the state. Many of these plaintiffs have lived most
of their lives outside of California and their alleged exposures to asbestos

1. For example, many courts have adopted inactive dockets to address claims brought by
unimpaired claimants. See Mark A. Behrens & Manuel L6pez, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They
Are Constitutional,24 REV. LITIG. 253, 262 (2005). The Ohio and Michigan Supreme Courts have
recently acted to prevent the joinder of asbestos-related claims. See OHIO R. Civ. P. 42(A)(2);
Admin. Order No. 2006-6, Prohibition on "Bundling" cases (Mich. Aug. 9, 2006).
2. See Dominica C. Anderson & Kathryn L. Martin, The Asbestos Litigation System in the
San FranciscoBay Area: A Paradigmof the NationalAsbestos Litigation Crisis, 45 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1,4 (2004).

took place elsewhere. Hundreds of asbestos cases filed by out-of-state
plaintiffs are pending in the California courts. In many instances, these
filings name California companies as defendants, regardless of the merits of
the claims against those companies. The California defendants are named
simply to try and keep the cases in the California courts. These filings occur
for a number of reasons, including the geographic convenience to plaintiffs'
counsel, the well-established and understood case management procedures
in certain counties with historically high-volume asbestos dockets, the
perception that California law is "plaintiff friendly," and the potential for
large awards.
Judges in California have acknowledged the ever-increasing burden
placed on the judicial system by the state's asbestos docket. At a
symposium hosted by the University of San Francisco School of Law,
several judges expressed concern that the city's juror resources were being
used improperly because the residents were forced to sit as jurors in cases
that had nothing to do with them.3
Other jurisdictions faced with significant numbers of asbestos claims
have taken steps to address the problems of out-of-state filings. For
example, in 2004, the judge overseeing asbestos litigation in Madison
County, Illinois, ordered the transfer of an out-of-state mesothelioma case,
noting that
As much as this judge, or any judge with any compassion
whatsoever, would like to do anything to assist such a litigant, with
expedited schedules and to accommodate him in any way possible;
such accommodation must be reasonable in following the law. The
court must consider, not only how many jury trials actually occur
out of this docket; but, also what would happen if every case or
even a similar percentage of these cases to all other types of civil
jury lawsuits were to go to trial ....
If large numbers of these cases did actually go to trial, then this
docket would no longer be the "cash cow." Such circumstances
would place an astronomical burden upon the citizens of Madison
County to serve as jurors; would require more trial judges,
courtrooms, clerks, bailiffs and other necessary accommodations
than could be handled. It is one thing to make such efforts to
accommodate the citizens of Madison County and others whose
cases bear some connection or other reasons to be here.

3. Judges Roundtable: Where Is
ASBESTOS, 2, 67 (July 2004).

California Asbestos Litigation Heading, COLUMNS:
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But when, as in the case being considered, there is no connection
with the county or with this state; the trial judge would probably be

required to apply Louisiana law (another factor not only of
difficulty to the trial judge but a consideration of local problems
being decided locally); the treating physicians are all from

Louisiana; there is a similar asbestos docket with expedited trial
settings for persons similarly situated to the plaintiff herein; the
distance from the home forum and the area of exposure is in excess

of 700 miles and this county has such an immense docket; the case
should be transferred. 4

Similarly, the court in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which oversees tens of
thousands of asbestos claims, ruled in 2002 that it would no longer set cases
for trial unless the plaintiff is a resident of Ohio, was a resident of Ohio
during the period of alleged exposure, or was employed in Ohio at the time
of the alleged exposure.5 The Mississippi Supreme Court also has issued a

series of recent rulings to address the problem of forum shopping by
nonresident plaintiffs.6
It is not appropriate, let alone legally necessary, for cases presenting

little or no contact with California to remain on local dockets. Many of
these cases should be transferred to more appropriate venues under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.
A.

The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the Current State of
CaliforniaLaw
California Code of Civil Procedure § 410.30 codifies the doctrine of

forum non conveniens and can be utilized as a tool in asbestos-related
actions to have cases with little or no contact with California dismissed and
brought in a more appropriate forum.7
4. Palmer v. Riley Stoker Corp., No. 04-L-167 (Madison County Cir. Ct., I11.Oct. 04, 2004).
See also Gridley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 269, 280 (I11.2005) (according
plaintiff's choice of forum less deference when plaintiff is not from Madison County and the action
giving rise to the litigation occurred elsewhere because "the residents of Illinois should not be
burdened with jury duty given the fact that the action did not arise in, and has no relation to,
Illinois").
5. See In re Asbestos Master Case, No. CV-073958, Notice of Electronic Filing of Case
Management Order (Oct. 11, 2002).
6. See, e.g., Culbert v. Johnson & Johnson, 883 So. 2d 550, 553 (Miss. 2004) (transferring instate cases to the proper county and dismissing out-of-state plaintiffs).
7. California Code of Civil Procedure § 410.30 provides,
[w]hen a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of
substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall
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The seminal decision on this doctrine is the California Supreme Court's
decision in Stangvik v. Shiley Inc.,8 which involved plaintiffs who resided in
Norway and Sweden who filed tort actions against a defendant California
corporation and its parent company for heart valve implants which allegedly
failed and caused the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. 9 The defendants
contended that the cases would be more appropriately tried in Norway and
Sweden-the countries where plaintiffs lived, where the products were sold,
where decedents' medical care was received, and where substantially all of
the evidence to be introduced at trial was located.' 0 The trial judge granted
defendants' motion to stay subject to certain conditions, finding that the
foreign jurisdictions were appropriate jurisdictions and that the balance of
public and private interests favored defendants' request that 2the action not
proceed in California. " This decision was upheld on review.'
The Stangvik court described forum non conveniens as an "equitable
doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court" to decline jurisdiction
of a case, even when the requirements of general venue had been met. 3 The
court ruled that the plaintiffs had unfairly or unreasonably invoked the
jurisdiction of an inconvenient forum.' 4 Simply stated, if a case would be
more conveniently, efficiently, and fairly tried in the forum in which it arose
and it would be oppressive or inconvenient, or an unwarranted extra burden
on the courts of the forum, it should be tried in the more convenient forum,
rather than the forum of plaintiffs' choice.
When considering a motion to dismiss or stay an action in California
based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the courts weigh whether
there is a suitable alternative forum and the private and public interests
involved. 15

B. Is the Alternative Forum Suitable?
The threshold question in a motion for forum non conveniens is whether
a suitable forum exists.' 6 A suitable forum is one where plaintiffs claims
are not barred by the statute of limitations in the alternative jurisdiction and
where the defendants are amenable to service of process. 7 If a defendant is
stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
8. 819 P.2d 14,14 (Cal. 1991).
9. Id.at 16.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 25-26.
13. Id.at 17.
14. Id. at 16.
15. See Hansen v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 232-33 (Ct. App.
1996).
16. See Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17.
17. See id. at 18.
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not subject to jurisdiction in the alternative locality, the forum will not be
deemed suitable. 8 Either of these deficiencies, however, can be cured if the
defendant stipulates to service of process in the alternative forum or waives
a statute of limitations defense.' 9 A court must find that a forum is suitable
if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the
matter.2 ° This determination is not discretionary. 2'
By nature, asbestos-related litigation involves numerous defendants.
Defendants are typically manufacturers, suppliers, or contractors who
allegedly sold, distributed, or installed an asbestos-containing product to
which the plaintiff was exposed and which allegedly contributed to the
plaintiff's condition. Generally, the central argument in opposition to
defendants' motions for forum non conveniens is that a case cannot be
dismissed to an alternative jurisdiction because the moving party has failed
to show that all defendants are amenable to service of process in the
alternative forums.
For example, the plaintiffs in Hansen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. argued that it would be improper to stay the action in California
because it could not be shown that three of the defendants in the California
action would be amenable to service of process and the jurisdiction of the
Montana courts. 22 The appellate court upheld the trial court's granting of a
defendant's motion to dismiss or stay and determined that in asbestos cases
with numerous defendants it was unreasonable to expect the moving
defendant to probe whether all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in the
alternative forum.23 The court explained, "we are aware of no authority that
a moving defendant must show
all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in a
24
particular alternative forum.",

18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Am. Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (Ct. App.
2001); Chong v. Super. Ct., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997); Shiley Inc. v. Super. Ct., 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 41 (Ct. App. 1992).
21. See Chong, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430; Shiley, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41.
22. See Hansen,59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232.
23. See id. at 234.
24. Id. at 232. See also Budgery v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 2003 WL 21652278 (Cal. App. 2
Dist.) (July 14, 2003) (unpublished) (forum non conveniens stay affirmed where plaintiff was a life
long resident of Michigan and was employed in California for less than two years). But see Oster v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 2003 WL 1991988 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003) (unpublished) where the court

distinguished Hansen and vacated the forum non conveniens stay because the moving defendant had
not shown that all defendants were amenable to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. The court
noted that in Oster there were "only" thirty remaining asbestos defendants and "only two of these
were the primary focus of dispute" regarding jurisdiction. Id. at *2. Thus the case remained in
California even though: "Oster's alleged exposure to asbestos in North Dakota, New York, Illinois,
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Courts have expressed concern about dismissing a case in favor of an
alternative forum when a co-defendant in the action is not subject to
jurisdiction in that alternative forum. 25 The appropriate remedy, then, is to
grant the defendant's motion to stay with the qualification that plaintiffs
could have the stay lifted at a later date if, after filing suit in the alternative
forum, they could conclusively show that any defendant
or defendants were
26
not subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum.
C. Balancing of Privateand PublicInterests

Once the court determines that the alternative forum is suitable, it must
use its discretion to balance the private interests of the litigants versus the
public's interest in retaining the action for trial in California.2 7 The private
interest factors that a court must consider include those that make trial and
the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively
inexpensive (such as the ease of access to sources of proof), the cost of
obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.28
In asbestos cases, the court evaluates the residency of the plaintiff, sites
of asbestos exposure, and location of witnesses and evidence. 29 Courts
generally will find that private interests favor the alternate forum and the
moving party has met its burden when the plaintiff has lived mostly in the
alternate forum, almost all of the alleged asbestos exposure occurred in the
alternate forum, and almost all witnesses and evidence are from the alternate
forum.3 The public and private factors must be applied flexibly by the
hearing judge with less deference to a non-resident plaintiff.3'
The public interest factors include a desire to avoid placing unwarranted
burdens on local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of
local jurors who will be called to be a trier of fact in a case that does not
involve issues pertinent to their state of residence, and evaluating the
competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction. 32
The California Supreme Court in Stangvik considered and rejected the
argument that choice of forum should be afforded weight in deciding

Iowa and on board a U.S. Navy ship." Id. "The sole alleged contact with California consisted of the
claim that asbestos-containing products had been installed on the U.S.S. Bennington while it was
docked in San Francisco several years before decedent was stationed aboard the vessel." Id. at * 1.
25, See Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 18 (Cal. 1991).
26. See id.
27. See id.
at 17.
28. See id.
29. See Hansen, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
30. See id. at 232-34.
31. See Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18.
32. Id. at 17-18.
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whether California should retain jurisdiction.3 3 The court also considered
and rejected the argument that California should retain jurisdiction in a case
where California law is more favorable to plaintiffs theories of liabilities
than in the alternative jurisdiction.3 4 Specifically, the court said the fact that
California may have more favorable law is not entitled to any weight in
deciding a motion based on forum non conveniens, provided that some
remedy is available in the alternative jurisdiction.35
D. Application of Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine by California Courts

The suitability of the alternative forum is a legal question reviewed de
novo on appeal. 3 6 Once the court determines that the alternative forum is
suitable, however, the balancing of private and public interests is a task
within the discretion of the trial court. 3 7 Frequently, the challenging analysis
in a motion for forum non conveniens is not whether the alternative
jurisdiction is "suitable," but rather the final determination with regard to the
balance of public and private interests. The California trial courts have great
latitude in ruling on whether to transfer cases to an alternative forum when a
plaintiff has minimal contacts with California, because the decision is up to
the discretion of each individual judge.38
Some California courts appear willing to transfer cases where the
plaintiff is a resident of another state and where all (or almost all) of the
plaintiff s work and residential history occurred outside of California. Other
courts, however, have been less willing to do so. In general, California
courts appear less willing to dismiss where the plaintiff served in the armed
forces and was exposed to asbestos-containing materials in California for
some period of time. To date, no court has promulgated any type of
threshold of time for the purposes of defeating a motion. Overall, the forum
non conveniens doctrine in asbestos cases has been applied inconsistently.
Unfortunately, some courts have been willing to simply deny
defendants' motions to dismiss where plaintiffs have alleged asbestos
exposure in California, even if the exposure was only for a limited amount
of time or a disproportionately small length of time when viewed in terms of
a plaintiff's entire work history.

33.
34.
35.
36.
2001).
37.
38.

Id. at 19-20.
Id.
Id. at n.5.
See Am. Cemwood Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 674 (Ct. App.
See id.; see also Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17-18.
See Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17-18.

For example, in Westerlind v. Allied Packing,39 in San Francisco, Judge
Ronald E. Quidachay denied a motion for forum non conveniens brought by
defendants against an eighty-year old plaintiff who was a Massachusetts
resident his entire life, except for the three years he spent in the U.S. Navy
from 1943 to 1946.40
Mr. Westerlind's service aboard naval vessels
overhauled and ported on the Pacific Coast constituted the only contacts he
had with California over a forty-year exposure period. 4' Nonetheless, the
court ruled that his action was properly venued in California and that the
defendants failed to meet their burden to move the case.42 The court
reasoned that both plaintiffs' counsel and non-Navy defendants would likely
focus on 1943 to 1946 as a significant period of amphibole asbestos
exposure.43 Therefore, San Francisco continues to be a popular venue for
out of state plaintiffs who served in the Navy, shipping into and out of Bay
Area ports like Hunter's Point, Alameda and Mare Island.
While trial courts are increasingly reluctant to transfer a case to an
alternate venue, a recent appellate court case has made it easier for a
defendant moving to transfer venue, by recognizing that a motion for
inconvenient forum may be appropriate even after significant discovery has
taken place. The recent opinion in Morris v. AGFA Corp4 , provides that
there is no time limit for filing a motion to stay based on inconvenient
forum.4 5 Morris was brought by the family members of a deceased worker
who was allegedly exposed to toxic substances which caused decedent's
leukemia and death. Plaintiffs were residents of Texas and the decedent
spent the last 20 years of his life in Texas.4 6 The trial court held that the
motion to transfer was timely even though it was brought almost one year
after the filing of the Complaint, after significant written discovery
had occurred.47
The Court also held that the plaintiffs' home state of Texas was a
suitable alternative forum even though Mr. Morris worked as a pressman for
various commercial printing companies in California where he was allegedly

39. No. CGC 05- 446842 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2005).

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Westerlind v. Allied Packing, No. CGC 05- 446842 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2005)
(Order Denying Motion for Forum Non Conveniens by Judge Ronald E. Quidachay). In another
example, Judge Ronald M. Sohigian denied a motion for forum non conveniens in LaFollette v. Auto
Zone, Inc., No. BC344891 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed July 10, 2006) and cited as one reason "California
has an interest in regulating asbestos exposure."
43. Westerlind v. Allied Packing, No. CGC 05- 446842 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2005)
(Order Denying Motion for Forum Non Conveniens by Judge Ronald E. Quidachay).
44. 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301 (2006).
45. Id. at 307-08.
46. Id. at 304-05.
47. Id. at 307-08.
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exposed to toxic substances for six years.48 Mr. Morris lived and worked in
Northern California for only six of his twenty-five year career as a pressman
in commercial printing, but spent the last twenty years of his life living and
working in Texas. Also supporting their holding was the fact that pleadings
and discovery indicated that decedent's physicians and percipient witnesses
were located outside California.
Despite the recent holding in Morris, Judge Paul Alvarado of the San
Francisco Superior Court recently denied a Motion to Stay And/Or Dismiss
for Inconvenient Forum in the Stubblefield v. A. W. Chesterton Co., et al.
case on the grounds that the motion was untimely. The court noted that
although plaintiffs had just responded to written discovery after many
months of meeting and conferring, the motion was untimely because the trial
date was three months away.50 In Stubblefield, plaintiffs were lifelong
residents of Washington and Idaho and the decedent worked and lived nearly
his entire life in Washington, Idaho and Oregon except for the
approximately two years he served in the U.S. Navy in various Southern
California ports. Although the Court recognized that California was an
inconvenient forum it denied the motion because defendants were unable to
prove that all defendants were amenable to service in the proposed
alternative fora.
Decisions like Westerlind and Stubblefield have led to a reluctance by
defendants to bring forum non conveniens motions. As more and more outof-state asbestos cases are filed in California, there should be a greater
willingness by California courts to dismiss those cases so that they can be
heard in appropriate jurisdictions and reduce the unfair burden on California
jurors who have to take time off from work or be away from home to sit for
and decide such cases.
III.

THE "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR" TEST FOR ESTABLISHING CAUSATION IN
ASBESTOS CASES: How CAN A STANDARD THAT SOUNDS SO GOOD
IN THEORY BE So BAD IN APPLICATION?

In Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,"' the California Supreme Court
established the "substantial factor" test for determining causation in asbestos

48. Id. at 304,311-12.
49. Id. at 312.
50. Stubblefield v. A. W. Chesterton Co., et al., No. CGC 05-443078 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed July
13, 2005) (Order Denying Motion to Stay And/Or Dismiss for Inconvenient Forum by Judge Paul H.
Alvarado).
51. 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
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personal injury litigation.52 This test has been much quoted, interpreted, and
misapplied to the point that any exposure to asbestos, however insubstantial,
seems to be sufficient for a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. The
following analysis addresses recent decisions from the California Courts of
Appeal applying the substantial factor test in low dose or de minimis
exposure cases. It also analyzes recently adopted jury instructions and
California Supreme Court decisions limiting liability based on public policy
considerations, and the potential application of those instructions and
decisions in low dose or de minimis exposure cases.
A.

The SubstantialFactorTest

The California Supreme Court first adopted the substantial factor test for
cause-in-fact determinations in Mitchell v. Gonzales,5 3 a wrongful death case
brought by the parents of a boy who drowned.5 4 The defendants were
friends of the decedent; they had taken him to a lake, and the boy, who could
not swim, drowned after his friend rocked the paddleboard on which they
were playing, and the paddleboard tipped over." 5 The trial court refused the
plaintiffs' request for a substantial factor instruction on causation.5 6 Instead,
the court instructed using a "but for" instruction, as set forth in BAJI No.
3.75.57 The jury concluded that the defendants were negligent but that the
negligence was not the cause of death. 58 The appellate court reversed,
finding that the trial court erred in refusing to give the6 substantial factor
instruction 59 and the California Supreme Court affirmed . 0
The California Supreme Court definitively adopted the substantial factor
test for cause-in-fact determinations, because the court found that it
generally produces the same results as the "but for" rule of causation while
reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as
independent and concurrent causes in fact. 61 The court was attempting to
avoid any misunderstanding engendered by the term "proximate cause" in
such determinations, which seemed to cause jurors "to focus improperly on
the cause that is spatially or temporally closest to the harm. 62 In touting the

52. Id. at 1214.
53. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
54. Id.at 873.
55. Id. at 873-75.
56. Id. at 873.
57. "A proximate cause of [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] is a cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, produces the [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] and without which the
[injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] would not have occurred." BAJI No. 3.75 (7th ed.).
58. Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 875.
59. Id.at 873.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 878-79.
62. Id. at 878.
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superiority of the substantial factor test, the court noted that it was
"sufficiently intelligible to any layman to furnish an adequate guide to the
jury, and it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to lower terms" '63 for
"[i]f the conduct which is claimed to have caused the injury had nothing at
all to do with the injuries, it could not be said that the conduct was a factor,
let alone a substantial factor, in the production of the injuries." 64 Then came
asbestos litigation, with its multiple defendants and potential concurrent
causes in fact.
The "substantial factor" test somehow became
less "substantial."
For instance, in Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. ,65 a products liability
case brought by the estate of a worker who had been exposed to asbestoscontaining products and subsequently died of lung cancer, the trial court
instructed the jury pursuant to a local general order that shifted the burden to
the defendant to prove that its products were not a legal cause of the
worker's cancer.66 The California Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
general order and, in its discussion of the proper jury instructions on
causation to be given when multiple potential causes of harm exist, set forth
the controlling standard in California for proving causation in an asbestosinduced personal injury case: "[T]he plaintiff must first establish some
threshold exposure to the defendant's defective asbestos-containing
products, and must further establish in reasonable medical probability that a
particular exposure or series of exposures was a 'legal cause' of his injury,
i.e., a substantialfactor in bringing about the injury.,, 67 The court went
on to state:
In an asbestos-related cancer case, the plaintiff need not prove that
fibers from the defendant's product were the ones, or among the
ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular growth.
Instead, the plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure
to defendant's product was a substantial factor causing the illness
by showing that in reasonable medical probability it was a
substantial factor contributing to the plaintiffs or decedent's risk of
developing cancer.68

63. William L. Prosser, ProximateCause in California, 38 CAL. L. REv. 369, 379 (1950).
64. Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 878-79 (quoting Doupnik v. General Motors Corp., 275 Cal. Rptr. 715,
721 (Ct. App. 1990)).
65. 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
66. Id. at 1206.
67. Id. at 1223.
68. Id.

Put another way, the critical question is whether a "plaintiffs exposure
to [a] defendant's asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical
probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of
asbestos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled
or ingested, and hence to the risk
69
of developing asbestos-related cancer.,
The California Supreme Court acknowledged that there could be
multiple "substantial" factors causing a plaintiffs illness:
Ultimately, the sufficiency of the evidence of causation will depend
on the factual circumstances of each case. Although the plaintiff
must, in accordance with traditional tort principles, demonstrate to a
reasonable medical probability that a product or products supplied
by the defendant, to which he became exposed, were a substantial
factor in causing his disease or risk of injuries, he is free to further
establish that his particular asbestos disease is cumulative in nature,
with many separate exposures each having constituted
a "substantial
70
factor" that contributed to his risk of injury.
Factors to consider in determining whether inhalation of fibers from the
particular product should be deemed a "substantial factor" in causing the
cancer include "the length, frequency, proximity and intensity of exposure,
the peculiar properties of the individual product, any other potential causes
to which the disease could be attributed (e.g., other asbestos products,
cigarette smoking), and perhaps other factors affecting the assessment of
comparative risk ....
In Rutherford, the California Supreme Court recognized that "a force
which plays only an 'infinitesimal' or 'theoretical' part in bringing about
injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor," but warned that
Undue emphasis should not be placed on the term "substantial."
For example, the substantial factor standard, formulated to aid
plaintiffs as a broader rule of causality than the "but for" test, has
been invoked by defendants whose conduct is clearly a "but for"
cause of plaintiff's injury but is nevertheless urged as an
insubstantial contribution to the injury. Misused in this way, the
substantial factor test "undermines the principles of comparative
negligence, under which a party is responsible for his or her share of
72
negligence and the harm caused thereby.,

69.
70.
71.
72.
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Id. at
Id. at

1219.
1206-07 (internal citation omitted).
1218.
1214 (quoting Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 879).
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Seizing on this language, plaintiffs routinely assert that a substantial
factor is anything which is not negligible, theoretical, or infinitesimal.
Courts and juries that have agreed with this interpretation have reduced
California's causation standard from a substantial burden to a minimal one.
While perhaps unintended by the California Supreme Court, the Rutherford
decision equated risk with cause, thereby allowing juries to render liability
on parties whose conduct
or products were merely possible causes of the
73
plaintiffs injuries.
B.

Courts Have Held That De Minimis Exposure Can Satisfy the
SubstantialFactor Test

The recent case of Jones v. John Crane, Inc. 74 applied the Rutherford
substantial factor test to a defendant's assertion that de minimis exposure to
its asbestos-containing product was insufficient to cause the decedent's lung
cancer. 7 Plaintiff was exposed to the asbestos-containing products of many
defendants during his twenty-seven year naval career. 6
Most of the
defendants settled before trial, and the case proceeded to jury trial against
John Crane, Inc. ("Crane").77 The jury returned a special verdict in
plaintiff's favor, finding that Crane's products were defective and that Crane
was negligent. 8 The jury apportioned 1.95% of the fault for plaintiff's
injuries to Crane.79
On appeal, Crane argued that there was no substantial evidence that its
products were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs cancer.80 Crane
conceded that the plaintiff met the threshold showing under the substantial
factor test that he had been exposed to Crane's asbestos-containing
products. 81 Instead, Crane argued that "fiber releases from its product were
comparable to ambient levels of asbestos in the community8 2 at large and
cannot be found to have increased [plaintiff s] risk of cancer.,

73. See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 914 P.2d. 1203, 1206-07 (Cal. 1997).
74. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
75. Id. at 149.
76. Id. at 148.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 150.
82. Id. at 151. The occurrence of such "background" or "ambient" exposure from environmental
or man-made sources is well-documented in scientific and medical studies. In fact, the following
observation has been made:
Exposure to asbestos in the ambient indoor and outdoor environments results from many
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In reiterating and applying Rutherford's substantial factor test, the Court

of Appeal rejected Crane's argument.83 The court held that substantial
evidence supported the jury's verdict and said, "[t]he testimony of the
experts provided substantial evidence that [plaintiff's] lung cancer was

caused by cumulative exposure, with each of many separate exposures
84

having constituted substantial factors contributing to his risk of injury.

While attempting to "heed the admonition in Rutherford to be wary of the

misapplication of the substantial factor test," the court indicated, in rather
unfortunate language, that "a level of exposure that is equivalent of that

which one might be exposed in the ambient air over a lifetime is not
necessarily insignificant," and that "[t]he mere fact that comparable levels
[of asbestos fibers] could be found85 in ambient air does not render the
exposure 'negligible or theoretical."'
In Hoeffer v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,86 a recent unpublished decision

from the First District (Division Two) of the Court of Appeal, the court
followed Jones and reached the same conclusion.87 Hoeffer involved
alleged exposure to asbestos from electrical components manufactured by

Rockwell's predecessors, which plaintiff claimed caused his
mesothelioma. 88 The jury found that 5 % of plaintiff's harm was caused by
defendant Rockwell. Rockwell appealed, claiming that substantial evidence
was lacking because there was no expert testimony "quantifying, or even

sources, both natural and man-made. Chrysotile asbestos, which accounts for 90% of the
asbestos used in the United States, has become a ubiquitous contaminant of ambient air.
It has been noted that asbestos fibers can be found in the lungs of almost everyone in the
American population.
Gary N. Greenberg & Dennis J. Darcey, Occupationaland Environmental Exposure to Asbestos, in
PATHOLOGY OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASES 19, 25-26 (Victor L. Roggli et al., eds., 1992).
Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral that can be found in soils, rocks, and water throughout the
United States-particularly in urban environments. As a result, exposure to asbestos occurs in nonoccupational or environmental settings such that everyone in the general population has some
asbestos in their lungs. See Andrew Churg & Martha L. Wamock, Asbestos Fibers in the General
Population, 122 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 669, 669-677 (1980). This exposure constitutes
"background" or "ambient" exposure. It is well-documented that such exposure occurs, and that
everyone has some asbestos in their lungs.
83. Jones, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 150-51.
84. Id. at 151. The court responded to Crane's argument that the fibers released from its
products were no greater than the ambient level of asbestos in the atmosphere by citing contradictory
testimony from plaintiffs expert industrial hygienist and other studies showing far higher exposure
ranges for packing materials. Id.
85. Id. at 151-52 (citation omitted). Referring to the testimony of plaintiffs' expert pathologist,
the court noted that "if a person were exposed to six different products, each with a release level
similar to the asbestos levels recorded in ambient air, the combined concentration in the total dose
would contribute substantially to the increased risk of cancer." Id. at 151.
86. No. 413073, 2006 WL 185479 (Cal. App. Dist. 1 Jan. 26, 2006) (unpublished).
87. Id. at *4-7. Hoeffer cannot be cited as precedent per Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115 (2007), but
the opinion provides an example of the scope and extent of evidence deemed sufficient by a San
Francisco trial court and appellate court to satisfy the substantial factor test.
88. Id. at *2.
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characterizing, [plaintiffs] exposures to asbestos" from Rockwell products,
and that "[w]ithout such expert testimony, [plaintiff] is unable to prove legal
causation."' 9 The court disagreed, finding that "there was substantial
evidence from which the jury could conclude that exposure to Rockwell's
asbestos-containing products 'was a substantial factor in contributing to the
aggregate dose of asbestos plaintiff inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk
of developing asbestos-related cancer."' 90
Plaintiffs alleged exposure to Rockwell's asbestos-containing products
stemmed from two incidents. 91 In one, plaintiff helped clean up electrical
components smashed by a gyroscope; the components allegedly contained
asbestos. 92 In the second, plaintiff supervised the clean up of broken
electrical panel boxes. 93 Plaintiff's experts testified that broken components
could "emit" fibers and that "every" exposure contributes to the cumulative,
allegedly causative dose. 94 The court concluded that "[t]here was substantial
evidence from which the jury could conclude that Hoeffer's exposure to
asbestos was more than negligible or theoretical, and a substantial factor in
contributing to his aggregate dose of asbestos and hence to his risk of
developing mesothelioma." 95
The applications of Rutherford by the courts in Jones and Crane
demonstrates that, at least for some courts, any evidence of increased risk is
deemed sufficient evidence of causation, thus illustrating how low the bar
has dropped.
C. Injecting "Substantial" Back Into the SubstantialFactor Test

Neither Jones nor Hoeffer discuss the applicable jury instructions for the
substantial factor test, and neither opinion adequately addresses the
applicability of "but for" causation with regard to exposure claims. The
recently adopted standard instruction for the substantial factor test, however,
and the California Supreme Court's recent endorsement of "but for"
causation in a non-asbestos case may help to resolve plaintiffs' claims in low
dose or de minimis exposure cases. Furthermore, certain policy limitations
89. Id. at *5.
90. Id. at *6 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219).
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.at *6.
95. Id.at *3.Rockwell also claimed that plaintiffs experts' testimony amounted to a "one fiber"
theory of causation and bad policy given the volume of asbestos litigation and asbestos filings. The
court responded that it "is not in a position to dictate public policy any more than it can dictate
scientific realities." Id. at *7, n.6.
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embodied in the concept of proximate cause may limit liability for de
minimis exposure as a matter of law.
1. The New Jury Instructions
Asbestos claims require proof that exposure to a manufacturer's
products or resulting from a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
causing a plaintiffs alleged injuries. 96 Notwithstanding the California
Supreme Court's admonition in Rutherford to avoid undue emphasis on the
term "substantial, 97 the court in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co.,98 noted
that a force that is "infinitesimal," "negligible," or "theoretical" cannot
satisfy the substantial factor test. 99
California's new standard jury instructions,' 0 0 issued after Rutherford
and Bockrath were decided, also define "substantial factor" in CACI 430:
A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable
person would consider to have contributed to the harm. It must be
more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not have to be the only
cause of the harm.
[Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same
harm would have occurred without that conduct.]' 0 1
As the use notes indicate, this instruction incorporates Comment a of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, which provides, in part:
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the
defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the
popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility,
rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense" which includes
every one of the great number of02 events without which any
happening would not have occurred. 1

96. Id. at *2.
97. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997).
98. 980 P.2d 398 (Cal. 1999).
99. Id. at 403-04.
100. CACI 430, 431, and 435, discussed herein, replace BAJI 3.76, 3.77, and 3.78. The juries
rendered their verdicts in Jones and Hoeffer before the Judicial Council approved the new jury
instructions. Neither appellate court discussed the instructions used by the trial courts. Presumably,
the trial courts utilized the BAJI instructions.
101. CACI430.
102. CACI 430, Sources and Authority (quoting RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a
(1965)).
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The notes also direct use of CACI 431 for cases of multiple
concurrent causes:
A person's negligence may combine with another factor to cause
harm. If you find that [name of defendant]'s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]'s harm, then [name
of defendant] is responsible for the harm. [Name of defendant]
cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person,
condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing [name of
plaintiff]'s harm. 103
CACI 435, following the specific mandate of Rutherford, further
explains the role of the substantial factor test in asbestos-related
cancer cases:
[Name of plaintiff] may prove that exposure to asbestos from [name
of defendant]'s product was a substantial factor causing
[his/her/[name of decedent]'s] illness by showing, through expert
testimony, that there is a reasonable medical probability that the
exposure contributed to [his/her] risk of developing cancer."
05

As noted in Lineaweaver v. PlantInsulation Co.:'

Many factors are relevant in assessing the medical probability that
an exposure contributed to plaintiffs asbestos disease. Frequency
of exposure, regularity of exposure, and proximity of the asbestos
product to plaintiff are certainly relevant, although these

considerations should not be determinative in every case.
Additional factors may also be significant in individual cases, such

103. CACI 431.
104. CACI 435. A similar and consistent version of this instruction was approved by the First
District (Division Five) in Grahn v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. A098818, 2004 WL 2075571 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 2004) (unpublished). The California Supreme Court granted review to consider
premises liability issues, but transferred the matter back to the appellate court with directions to
vacate its decision and to reconsider the case in light of Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., 123 P.2d 931,
940-42 (Cal. 2005), which held that a premises owner who knows, or should know, of a latent or
concealed preexisting dangerous condition on its property may be liable to an employee of an
independent contractor hired to work on the premises if the contractor neither knew nor should have
known of the danger.
105. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App. 1995).

as the type of asbestos product to which plaintiff was exposed, the
type of injury suffered
by plaintiff, and other possible sources of
106
plaintiffs injury.
In an asbestos action, the length, frequency, regularity, proximity, and
intensity of plaintiffs alleged exposure to asbestos, coupled with the type of
fibers at issue, might very well establish that such exposure was no greater
or different than background or ambient exposure and that such exposure
was nothing more than "one of the great number of events without which
any happening would not have occurred." 10 7 De minimis exposure may be
nothing more than a "remote or trivial" contribution to the plaintiffs risk of
developing cancer.I°8 If,
for example, the alleged exposure, extended over a
lifetime, would be insufficient to cause disease, then it cannot possibly have
contributed to other exposures to cause the disease. Indeed, if the plaintiff
had the same minimal risk of developing cancer without exposure to the
products, the manufacturer's conduct was not a substantial factor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached this
result in Kennedy v. Southern California Edison, Co.' 09 where the plaintiff

alleged that he brought home microscopic particles of radioactive materials
known as fuel fleas, which caused his wife to develop leukemia." 0 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, concluding
that the district court committed harmless error in refusing to give an
instruction based on Rutherford."' The court explained that Rutherford
applied in contexts in which a plaintiff develops a medical injury with
multiple possible causes, but held that the failure to instruct the jury
pursuant to Rutherford was harmless error. 2 The appellate court said:
At trial, the defendants introduced uncontroverted expert testimony
that, even if Mrs. Kennedy was exposed to "fuel fleas" as under
Kennedy's exposure scenario, there is only a one in 100,000 chance
that her [leukemia] was caused by the exposure. Indeed the
testimony went further-even assuming that we knew for certain
that Mrs. Kennedy's [leukemia] was caused by radiation (rather
than some other source), there would only be a one in 30,000
chance that "fuel flea" radiation would have been the actual cause.
On these facts, the contribution of the "fuel fleas," even assuming
exposure and ingestion and with full knowledge that the person in

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 906-07 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
CACI 430, Sources and Authority (quoting RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 431 cmt.a).
CACI 430.
268 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
at 766.
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 767, 770.
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question actually developed [leukemia], only played "an
'infinitesimal' or 'theoretical' part in bringing about [Mrs.
Kennedy's] injury." Because no reasonable jury could have found
that the "fuel fleas" were a "substantial factor" in causing Mrs.
Kennedy's [leukemia],
the failure to give a Rutherford instruction
113
was harmless error.
In Whiteley v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 114 the First District (Division Two)
of the Court of Appeal reached a similar result in a smoker's action against
tobacco companies." 5 A jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
finding, in part, that the companies' negligent design of their cigarettes was
a cause of plaintiffs lung cancer. 116 The Court of Appeal reversed, finding
that plaintiffs evidence of defendants' negligence in failing to implement
known technologies to reduce the carcinogen dose to which smokers were
exposed was a substantial factor contributing to plaintiffs cancer was
insufficient to support the finding that such negligence was a "cause" of her
injuries. 117 While the defendants did not "dispute that plaintiff had
adequately shown that [her] exposure to each defendant's cigarette products
'in reasonable medical probability' was a substantial factor in contributing to
the aggregate dose of [carcinogens she] inhaled or ingested, and hence to the
risk of developing [lung] cancer," the court nonetheless found that, from the
expert testimony presented, "[t]he jury could only speculate that the design,
manufacture and marketing of 'safer' cigarettes would have resulted
in
8
plaintiff ingesting fewer carcinogens or quitting smoking altogether.""
In Kennedy and Whiteley, mere evidence of exposure, slight or
extensive, was insufficient to satisfy Rutherford." 9 These cases demonstrate
the importance of developing evidence that the defendant's product or
conduct was in reasonable medical probability a substantial factor
contributing to the plaintiffs disease, or even to the risk of developing the
disease.

113. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
114. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (2004).
115. Id. at 864.
116. Following the trial court's ruling that federal law preempted strict liability on a consumer
expectations theory, plaintiff withdrew her remaining strict liability design defect claim based on a
risk-benefit theory and proceeded solely on a theory of negligence in design. See id. at 856 n.29.
117. Id.at863.
118. Seeid. at862-63.
119. See Kennedy, 368 F.3d at 770-71; Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863.

903

2. Buttressing "But For" Causation
As noted above, the second paragraph of CACI 430 states that
"[c]onduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would
have occurred without that conduct." 20 The Directions for Use state:
The "but for" test does not apply to concurrent independent causes,
which are multiple forces operating at the same time and
independently, each of which would have been sufficient by itself to
bring about the same harm. Accordingly, do not use this instruction
in a case involving concurrent independent causes.
The court should consider whether the bracketed language is
appropriate under Viner. The bracketed language may be used in
addition to the substantial factor instruction except in cases of
concurrent independent causes. 121
As discussed above, in Mitchell v. Gonzales, 122 the California Supreme
Court disapproved of instructing a jury regarding "proximate cause" because
it improperly focused the jury "on the cause that is spatially or temporally
closest to the harm."' 123 In so holding, Mitchell did not abandon or repudiate
the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that, but for the alleged
negligence, the harm would not have happened. Rather, the court stated that
jury instructions in such cases should use the substantial factor test which
"subsumes the 'but for' test., 124 The court further stated, "[i]f the conduct
which is claimed to have caused the injury had nothing at all to do with the
injuries, it could not be said that the conduct was a factor, let alone a
substantial factor, in the production of the injuries."' 125

Thus, Mitchell

emphasizes the importance of compelling the plaintiffs to establish that a
defendant's conduct had something to do with the production of the
plaintiff's injuries, or, in the context of an asbestos-related cancer case, a
reasonable medical probability that the conduct contributed to the risk of
developing cancer.
In Viner v. Sweet,126 a legal malpractice action involving transactional
work, the California Supreme Court determined that the client must prove
that the attorney's acts or omissions caused the client to suffer harm or loss
according to the "but for" test, meaning that the harm or loss "would not

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

CACI430.
CACI 430, Directions for Use (citation omitted).
819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
Id. at 878.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 P.3d 1046 (Cal. 2003).
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have occurred without the attorney's malpractice."1 27 The court noted that
the "but for" causation does not apply when the defendant's negligence was
a concurrent independent cause of the harm, explaining that "these forces
operated in combination, with none being sufficient
to bring about the harm,
1 28
they are not concurrent independent causes."
In Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 29 Crane argued "that Viner required
plaintiffs to show that defendant's product 'independently caused plaintiffs
injury or that, but for that exposure, [plaintiff] would not have contracted
lung cancer."' '. 30 Of course, this argument misconstrues the application of
the substantial factor test in asbestos cases and the First District rejected
Crane's argument. 3 ' The court noted that "Viner is consistent with
Rutherford in so far as Rutherford requires proof that an individual asbestoscontaining product is a substantial factor
contributing to the plaintiffs risk
32
or probability of developing cancer."
To add some teeth back to the substantial factor test, consistency with
Mitchell, Viner, and Rutherford may warrant modification of the bracketed
language of CACI 430 and inclusion after CACI 435. Such modification
could be as follows: Plaintiff may prove that exposure to asbestos from
defendant's product was a substantial factor causing his illness by showing,
through expert testimony, that there is a reasonable medical probability that
the exposure contributed to his risk of developing cancer. Defendant's
conduct is not a substantial factor in contributing to plaintiffs risk of
developing cancer if the plaintiff was subject to the same or similar risk
without that conduct.
Like the courts in Kennedy and Whitely, a jury instructed in this manner
may justifiably conclude that de minimis exposure to a manufacturer's
product or resulting from a defendant's conduct was not a substantial factor
in causing a plaintiffs illness.
3.

A Return to Proximate Cause

As stated above, the California Supreme Court in Mitchell disapproved
of instructing a jury regarding "proximate cause," because the language
improperly focused the jury "on the cause that is spatially or temporally

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1051.
35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 149.
See id. at 149 n.3.
Id. at 150n.3.

closest to the harm." 133 As noted by at least three subsequent California
Supreme Court decisions, however, Mitchell left intact the public policy
limitations of the proximate cause analysis to be applied by courts as a
matter of law. As the court noted in Viner, "[c]ausation analysis in tort law
generally proceeds in two stages: determining cause in fact and considering
various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability.' 34 Viner
only involved the cause in fact element. 135
In PPGIndustries, Inc. v. TransamericaInsurance Co., 136 the California
Supreme Court held that, although the insurer's negligence in failing to
settle an action against its insured was the cause in fact of a punitive
damages award against the insured, the insurer's negligence did not
proximately cause the award, based on three public policy factors. 137 In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that "three policy considerations...
strongly militate against allowing the insured, the morally culpable
wrongdoer in the third party lawsuit, to shift to its insurance company the
obligation to pay punitive damages resulting from the insured's egregious
misconduct in that lawsuit.' 3 8 First, allowing the insured to shift to its
insurer "its responsibility to pay the punitive damages in the third party
action would violate the public policy against reducing or offsetting liability
for intentional wrongdoing by the negligence of another."' 3 9 Second,
allowing the insurer to assume liability for punitive damages premised on
the egregious conduct of its insured would defeat the public policies
underlying these damages. 140 Finally, requiring the insurer to pay punitive
damages incurred by its insured would violate "the public policy against
indemnification for punitive damages." 141
In Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser,Heimann & Bernstein,142 the California
Supreme Court similarly held that public policy reasons foreclosed recovery
of lost potential punitive damages in a legal malpractice action,
notwithstanding proof that attorney malpractice was a cause in fact of the
loss. 143 The court stated the rationale for the public policy limitation as
follows:

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878 (Cal. 1991).
Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1048 n.1 (Cal. 2003) (citations omitted).
See id.
975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999).
See id. at 656.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
See id. at 656-57.
Id. at 658 (footnote omitted).
69 P.3d 965 (Cal. 2003).
Id. at 969.
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Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or property. For the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of
damages . . .is the amount which will compensate for all the
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not. Thus, an attorney's 'liability, as in other
negligence cases, is for all damages directly and proximately caused
by his negligence.'
Proximate cause involves two elements. One is cause in fact. An
act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event.
Whether defendant's negligence was a cause in fact of plaintiff's
damage... is a factual question for the jury to resolve.
By contrast, the second element focuses on public policy
considerations. Because the purported causes of an event may be
traced back to the dawn of humanity, the law has imposed
additional limitations on liability other than simple causality. These
additional limitations are related not only to the degree of
connection between the conduct and the injury, but also with public
policy. Thus, proximate cause is ordinarily concerned, not with the
fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy that
limit an actor's responsibility for the consequences of his
conduct. 144
The court listed several public policy considerations strongly militating
against allowing a plaintiff to recover lost punitive damages in a legal
malpractice action, including "permitting recovery ...would violate the
public policy against speculative damages,"' 145 "allowing recovery... would
hinder the ability of trial courts to manage and resolve mass tort actions" and
"may adversely impact the overall ability of courts to manage their caseloads
by making settlement more difficult,"' 1 46 and "allowing recovery ...may
147
exact a significant social cost.'
Asbestos personal injury cases, including low dose or de minimis
exposure claims, invoke many of these same policy considerations. The
"cumulative dose" or "one fiber theory" necessarily shifts responsibility to
less culpable or nonculpable parties; the contribution of de minimis exposure
to overall risk and harm is speculative; the vast web of parties with at most a

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
Id. at 971.
Id. at 972.
Id.
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tenuous connection to the harm makes case management, resolution, and
settlement burdensome for the courts and the parties; and the significant

social and societal costs of asbestos litigation are well known (e.g.,
bankruptcies). 148 Therefore, notwithstanding a jury's determination that de
minimis exposure was a cause in fact of a plaintiffs injury, a court's prudent

consideration of these various policy factors may preclude imposition of
liability as a matter of law.
Other courts have struggled with similar issues concerning substantial
factor in the asbestos litigation context.149 For example, courts have often
recognized that infrequent exposures simply do not suffice to show
substantial cause, particularly on a record where long term, frequent
exposures to other products are apparent and fully explain the condition in
question. 50 Thus, even where an expert asserts baldly that all of the

plaintiff's exposures were substantial factors in causing plaintiff's
mesothelioma, such conclusory statements should not suffice. As one court
stated, "[i]f an opinion such as [the expert's] would be sufficient for plaintiff
to meet his burden, the
meaningless."' 5 1

'substantial

factor'

test would be

IV. SHOULD THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADOPT DAUBERT OR SOME
OTHER STANDARD TO RAISE THE BAR FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY?

Much of the focus in asbestos cases centers on the admissibility of
expert testimony. In particular, given the very limited contact many
plaintiffs have with various defendants' products, and the attenuated and
inflammatory nature of some of the expert testimony offered by certain
plaintiffs' experts, admissibility of expert testimony is a major battleground.
Adoption of the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 152 would require a trial court

148. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, et al., The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers in Bankrupt
Firms, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 51, 76, 83 (2003); JESSE DAVID, THE SECONDARY IMPACTS OF
ASBESTOS LIABILITIES (Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs., Jan. 23, 2003); see also Mark A. Behrens,
Some Proposalsfor Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in
Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the
Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MiSS. L.J. 1 (2001); Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos
Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts' Duty to Help Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis,
(2002), availableat http://www.nlcpi.org/books/pdf/Vol6Number6June2002.pdf.
149. See Jeter v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 716 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(holding that the trial court erred in instructing the just to use "the dictionary definition of
'substantial' to define 'substantial factor').
150. See Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., 876 So. 2d 877, 894 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Thomas v. A.P.
Green Inuds., 933 So. 2d 843, 867-69 (La. Ct. App. 2006). Cf John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 604 S.E.2d
822, 826 (Ga. 2004) (refusing to apply the "substantial contributing factor" test).
151. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2005).
152. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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to assess the sufficiency of the data, ensure that the testimony is the product
of a reliable method and that the expert has, in fact, applied the methods
reliably to the particular facts of the case-all prior to that expert's
testimony being heard by the jury. 153
To date, the California Supreme Court has rejected Daubert and
declared its belief that the tests stated in Frye v. United States 5 4 and People
v. Kelly,'55 ("Kelly-Frye") represent the better standard for determining
whether expert testimony based on novel scientific methods has a sufficient
scientific basis such that it should be admitted into evidence.
For instance, in People v. Leahy, 5 6 the California Supreme Court
opined that Daubert offers no compelling reason for abandoning Kelly in
favor of the more "flexible" approach outlined in Daubert. The court
reasoned that the requirements of California Evidence Code Sections 720
and 801, "' Kelly, and Frye have acted well to keep unreliable evidence from

the jury. 158In fact, nineteen states, in addition to California, have adopted a
reliability test without embracing the Daubert standard. 5 9
Justice Lucas' opinion in Leahy addressed the California standards for
admissibility of scientific evidence in light of Daubert. He noted that the
California Evidence Code was enacted in 1965 and the "pertinent
provisions," such as Sections 210, 350, 720, and 801, have never been
amended.

60

He commented that, "[n]o significant relevant developments

have occurred in [California] since Kelly was decided to justify abandoning
its conclusions."' 6' Notably in Leahy, however, both the defendant and the

153. See David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
11,21-27 (2003).
154. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
155. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
156. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
157. California Evidence Code § 801(b) provides that an expert witness may testify to an opinion,
where the opinion is "based on matter... perceived by or personally known to the witness... that is
of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to
" CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 2004). Evidence Code § 803
which his testimony relates ....
further provides that "the court may, and upon objection, shall exclude testimony in the form of an
opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on a matter that is not a proper basis for such an
opinion." Id. at § 803.
158. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994).
159. These states are Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
160. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 327.
161. Id. at 328.
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People urged the court62to preserve the "cautious" and "conservative"
approach taken in Kelly. 1
Amici briefs urging the adoption of Daubert were submitted and
ultimately rejected by the Leahy court; these were submitted by District
Attorneys and the Attorney General's office and were concerned exclusively
with DNA testing. The briefs argued that if the court were inclined to keep
Kelly-Frye, it should clarify the standards by which to determine whether
something has gained "general acceptance."' 163 The court admitted that,
"improving or 'fixing' the Kelly rule may well have merit, but the present
case is not a good vehicle for addressing them."' 64
The Leahy court went on to say that the critics of Kelly-Frye focus on its
"conservative nature," marked by an undefined period of testing and study
before a new technique may be deemed generally accepted. 165 Frye,
however, and its "rigidity," only governs testimony regarding a new
scientific method. Frye's limited holding and application were not
addressed by the Leahy Court. In short, the court showed no inclination to
adopt Daubert. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, perhaps a different
outcome-at a minimum, improvements to the Kelly rule-is advisable.
A. FederalRule of Evidence 702 and Daubert

Admissibility of expert opinion testimony in federal courts is governed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.166 In Daubert,167 the United States
Supreme Court held that Rule 702 imposes on the trial court the obligation
to ensure that proffered scientific expert testimony is "not only relevant, but
reliable."' 168 The Court subsequently clarified that this basic gatekeeping
obligation applies to all expert testimony. 169 The Court explained that,
"[t]his entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether

162. Id.
163. Id. at 328-29.
164. Id. at 329-30.

165. Id. at 330.
166. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added) (as amended in 2000, based upon rulings subsequent to
Daubert).
167. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
168. Id. at 589.
169. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
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that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts
in issue."' 7 °
The initial step is to determine if the proposed expert is qualified to
testify before considering the other Daubert indicia of reliability.17' An
expert must be qualified to offer opinion testimony with respect to the
medical/scientific issues presented. 7 2 Defendants often argue that even
considering the reliability requirements set forth in Daubertand its progeny,
plaintiffs should be required to make a showing of reliability for their
experts' testimony as to each defendant. Defendants look for important facts
such as whether or not there is an opinion specific to a defendant, and
reliance upon documents relevant to that defendant in rendering expert
opinions. Otherwise, arguments can be made to exclude the testimony as
irrelevant and prejudicial.
B.

CaliforniaEvidence Code and Kelly-Frye

Pursuant to California Evidence Code Sections 720(a), 801(b), and 803,
and the holdings in Kelly, 173 Leahy,174 and their progeny, a party may move
a court for an order excluding from evidence the testimony and opinions of
an opposing party's expert.
Under these statutes an expert's opinion must be rigorously scrutinized.
As the court of appeal explained, "the law does not accord to the expert's
opinion the same degree of credence or integrity as it does the data
underlying the opinion. Like a house built on sand, the expert's opinion is
no better than the facts upon which it is based." 171 "When an expert bases
his or her conclusions on assumptions not supported by the record, on
matters not reasonably relied on by other experts, or on factors that are
remote, speculative,76 or conjectural, then his or her opinion lacks
evidentiary value." 1
When experts base their opinions on new scientific techniques, such as
complex data gathering and calculations, the California Supreme Court has
adopted the well-known test for admissibility first enunciated in Frye.177

170. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
171. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994).
172. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2004).

173. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
174. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
175. Kennemur v. State, 184 Cal. Rptr. 393, 402 (Ct. App. 1982).
176. See Wanland v. Los Gatos Lodge, Inc., 281 Cal. Rptr. 890, 896 (Ct. App. 1991).
177. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

The Frye test regarding admissibility of expert testimony, as enunciated
in Kelly, is concerned with and seeks to mitigate the "dangerous tendency of
lay jurors to give considerable and often undue weight to scientific evidence
presented by experts with impressive credentials."' 178
The California
Supreme Court has noted that such scientific procedures "are invested with a
'misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific process,
179
obscuring its currently experimental nature.'
In determining when to apply the rule, the California Supreme Court
looks to its "salutary purpose of preventing the jury from being misled by
unproven and ultimately unsound scientific methods."' 8 ° Indeed, the court
cautioned in Kelly that "there is ample justification for the exercise of
considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of evidence developed by
new scientific techniques,"' 1 and noted that "[t]here has always existed a
considerable lag between advances and discoveries in scientific fields and
their acceptance as evidence in a court proceeding."' 8 2 The court further
indicated that the test was designed to "retard . . . admissibility until the
scientific community has had ample opportunity to study, evaluate and
accept [the technique's] reliability."' 83
The California Supreme Court has made clear that these concerns
regarding sufficient scientific evaluation determine whether a scientific
technique is "new" for purposes of applying the Kelly test. For example, in
People v. Shirley, 184 the Attorney General argued that Kelly did not apply to
testimony assisted by hypnosis because hypnosis was an age old practice and
not a new scientific technique.' 85 The California Supreme Court rejected
that view as 8an
"unduly narrow" reading of Kelly, given its
6
salutary purpose. 1

Likewise, in People v. Leahy, 187 the court held that a sobriety test was a
new scientific technique within the scope of the Kelly rule, even though the
test had been used by officers in the field for almost thirty years. 88
' Leahy
held that in determining whether a scientific technique is "new" for Kelly
purposes, "long-standing use by police officers seems less significant a

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1375 (Cal. 1982).
Id. (quoting People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976)).
Id. (citing Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244-45).
Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244.
Id. at 1245 (quoting People v. Spigno, 319 P.2d 458, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
Id. at 1251 (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cit. 1974)).
723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982).
Id. at 1374.
Id.
882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 331-32.
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factor than repeated use, study, testing and confirmation by scientists or
trained technicians." 189
Under the Kelly test, the admissibility of expert testimony depends on a
three-step analysis: (1) the scientific method upon which the expert
testimony is based must be "reliable," which in this context means showing
that the technique has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs;" (2) the witness must be qualified as an expert to give an
90
opinion in the area; and (3) the correct scientific procedures must be used.'
The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of showing that the
scientific technique at issue satisfies the requirements of Kelly.' 9' Courts
have been emphatic in declaring that the testimony of the single witness is
rarely sufficient to meet the burden of proof placed upon the proponent of

the testimony. 192
Failure to satisfy even one prong of the test should result in exclusion of
the opinion. Techniques which are not accepted within the relevant,
qualified scientific community (the first prong of the Kelly test) are subject
to exclusion. 9' Likewise, even if a methodology is generally accepted, if
the proper scientific procedures for implementing it are not followed, the
opinion should be excluded.'94
The first prong of the Kelly test requires the court to determine whether,
reaching
his opinion, Mr. Brown relied upon a scientific technique
in
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
In determining whether the process or
field in which it belongs."' '9
technique has gained "general acceptance" plaintiff must show that a
substantial number of scientists in the community accept the technique as
reliable. 196 The California Supreme Court has indicated that in analyzing
this factor, courts should be willing to "forego admission of such techniques

189. Id. at 332.
190. Id. at 324-25 (quoting People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)).
191. Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1375-76. See also People v. Ashmus, 209 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508 (Ct. App.
1991).
192. See Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336. See also People v. Dellinger, 209 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App.
1984).
193. Wanland v. Los Gatos Lodge, Inc., 281 Cal. Rptr. 890, 896 (Ct. App. 1991).
194. See, e.g., Dellinger, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10 (excluding testimony where underlying test was
based on flawed procedures); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 746-77 (Ct. App. 1992)
(Kelly's "correct scientific procedures" requirement is not merely a question of weight but is an
element of the Kelly-Frye admissibility determination.).
195. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244.
196. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336 (quoting People v. Guerra, 690 P.2d 635, 656 (Cal. 1984)) ("[T]he
test is met if use of the technique is supported by a clear majority of the members of that
community.").

completely until reasonably certain that the pertinent scientific community
no longer views them as experimental or of dubious validity." 197 This all-ornothing approach was adopted in Kelly in full recognition that there would
be a "considerable lag" between scientific advances and their admission as
evidence in a court proceeding.'9 8
C. Using the Use of the CorrectScientific Procedures

In People v. Venegas, 199 the California Supreme Court emphasized that
the Kelly-Frye standard has three separate components, and to satisfy the
third prong, "the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct
scientific procedures were used in the particular case."200 The court noted
that the use of statistical probabilities to link a criminal defendant's DNA to
a particular crime was not a new scientific technique and indeed had
previously been approved by the court as generally accepted. 0 1
Nonetheless, Kelly was employed to determine whether the statistical
evaluation, as applied in a particular case, was in accordance with accepted
protocols for the method. 2 The court stated: "[The third prong] assumes
the methodology and technique in question has already met that requirement.
[I]t inquires into the matter of whether the proceduresactually utilized in the

case were in compliance with that methodology
and technique, as generally
20 3
accepted by the scientific community.,
The court then made clear that such methodological imperfections go to
the admissibility of the evidence. "Our reference to 'careless testing
affect[ing] the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility' . . . was

intended to characterize shortcomings other than the failure to use correct,
scientifically accepted procedures such
as would preclude admissibility
20 4
under the third prong of the Kelly test.,
The court then reviewed the test performed in that case to analyze
whether it had followed "correct, scientifically accepted procedures., ' 20 5 The
court concluded that the FBI did not use such procedures in that instance and
excluded the opinion from evidence.20 6 It also cautioned:

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
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Id. at 330 (quoting People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 710 (Cal. 1989)).
Id.
954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
Id. at 545 (quoting Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244).
Id.
at 546.
Id.
at 545.
Id.(citing People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 746 (Ct. App. 1992)).
Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 547.
Id.
at 554.
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To . . . leave it to jurors to assess the current scientific
debate on statistical calculation as a matter of weight rather
than admissibility, would stand Kelly-Frye on its head....
The result would be predictable. The jury would simply
skip to the bottom line-the only aspect of the process that
is readily understood-and look at the ultimate expression
• . . without competently assessing the reliability of the
207
process ....
Recently, however, a number of courts of appeal have examined the
breadth and application of the California evidence codes. The cases most
point are the Lockheed Litigation Cases, Lockheed 1208
scrutinized on this
209
and Lockheed IL
D. Roberti, Lockheed and the Future of Daubert in California
Widely reported as the would-be bellwether of California expert
reliability analysis and admissibility standards, Lockheed II has been granted
review by the California Supreme Court. Lockheed II will determine
whether California will require a trial court to undertake a meaningful
preliminary analysis of foundational reliability before allowing an expert to
offer an opinion based on non-novel scientific evidence.
Lockheed II was preceded by another case which stands for the
proposition that California's Kelly-Frye standard applies exclusively to new
scientific techniques. The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Four,
in Roberti v. Andy's Termite & Pest Control, Inc. 2'0 held that the trial court
applied a threshold admissibility test to plaintiffs expert testimony
regarding the dangers of exposure to pesticide and development of autism,
which was akin to the federal rule of Daubert, and not applicable under
California law. 21 ' The court reasoned that Roberti's experts did not rely
upon any new scientific technique, device, or procedure that had not gained
general acceptance in the relevant scientific or medical community, but

207. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742).
208. 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34 (Ct. App. 2004).
209. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Ct. App. 2005). The California Supreme Court has agreed to review
this case and as such, its ruling has been superseded. See Lockheed Litigation Cases, 110 P.3d 289
(Cal. 2005).
210. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827 (Ct. App. 2003).
211. Id. at 831.
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rather, the proffered evidence presented
a new theory of medical causation,
2 12
which was not subject to Kelly-Frye.
In Lockheed I, however, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division
Three, upheld an exclusion of the medical causation opinion of an expert on
the connection between solvent exposure and cancer. z13 The witness's
opinion was excluded on the grounds that the increased risks of cancer on
which he relied for his opinion were not tied to the chemicals in controversy
and the surveys did not show a sufficient increase in the incidence of the
particular kinds of cancers which were at issue. 1

The Court of Appeal

upheld exclusion of the witness's opinions because the underlying studies
upon which he relied did not isolate the five chemicals in controversy, relied
upon exposure to other known carcinogens, and were therefore "based on
conjecture and speculation as to which of the many substances to which the
study subjects were exposed contributed to the greater incidence
'
of cancer."215

In Lockheed II, again the court granted motions in limine to exclude the
opinions of the same witness on the grounds that the epidemiology studies,
animal studies, case reports, treatises and registries relied upon were either
irrelevant, unreliable, or causationally tenuous.21 6 As noted above, the
California Supreme Court has granted review of Lockheed II. On review,
the court will rule on whether or not Evidence Code Sections 801(b) and 803
require trial courts to weed out all expert testimony for reliability before
reaching the jury or if the courts may only apply the Kelly-Frye test as to
"new scientific" methods.
Should the California Supreme Court decide to require preliminary
screening, it may choose to look to Daubertas a model for assessing if the
testimony is based on sufficient facts, reliable principles, and supported by
applying the principles and methods to the facts. California has historically
allowed the trier of fact to be the final arbiter of the weight given to expert
testimony, but the court must now realize that this is not incongruous with
the role of the trial judge in excluding testimony that lacks proper
foundation. In fact, the preclusion of unreliable expert testimony allows the
trier of fact the opportunity, free of misleading "junk science," to most
accurately evaluate each side's evidence and decide what, if any, credence to
give it.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
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Id. at 831-32.
LockheedI, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38.
See id. at36.
Id. at 37-38.
Lockheed 1,23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 767-70 (Ct. App. 2005).

[Vol. 34: 883, 2007]

Asbestos Litigation in California
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

V.

SHOULD THE EFFECT OF JOINT LIABILITY BE EXPLAINED TO JURIES?

Prior to 1986, both economic and non-economic damages in California
were subject to joint liability: Proposition 51, which was adopted by
California voters in 1986,17 was intended to help remedy the inequities of
the "deep pocket rule" by
providing for "fair share," or several, liability for
21 8

non-economic damages.
Proposition 51, however, did not alter the fact that plaintiff may recover
from any solvent defendant the total amount of any economic damages.21 9
The plaintiff can select which and how many of the alleged tortfeasors to
name as defendants. Whatever unfortunate defendant remains in the case at
trial may bear the cost of the plaintiffs entire economic loss, regardless of
how little the defendant may have contributed to the loss. A minimally atfault defendant may still be saddled with a large damage award mainly
attributable to the fault of others.
Asbestos cases typically involve multiple defendants-frequently more
than twenty and often more than thirty. By the time these cases reach a
courtroom for trial, however, usually only one or, at most, a couple of
defendants remain. At the conclusion of the trial, when juries are asked to
determine the percentage liability to assign to the particular defendant(s)
before them, a compelling case can be made that the jury should understand
the consequences of its decision under the law of joint liability. If jurors
knew that the impact of even a 1% finding of liability might be enough to
make a 1% defendant liable for the full amount of economic damage, they
may reach a different, and arguably correct, outcome for admittedly remote
and tangential defendants.220
Thus, for example, a jury might find in a particular case that the plaintiff
has suffered $1 million in economic damages, but conclude that a particular
defendant should bear only 5% of the proportionate liability for that claim.
The jury no doubt would believe that its 5% finding of liability would
translate into a $50,000 assessment of economic damages against that
defendant. Unfortunately, given the current state of California law, that is
not necessarily the case. If there are no other defendants--or at least no
other solvent defendants-the 5% defendant may end up having to pay the
entire $1 million judgment for economic damages.

217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2004).
218. See id.
219. See id.; Buttram v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71, 75 (Cal. 1997).
220. See Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Civil Jury, 3 GEo. L.J. &
PUB. POL'Y 21 (2005).

917

There is good reason to believe that jurors are, at the very least,
distressed, and frequently appalled to make a determination similar to the
example above and then learn the true economic consequences of their
decision after they have been discharged. The non-economic damages
assessed against a defendant may reflect the jury's evaluation of
proportionate liability, but the economic damages award would not.
Juries should be informed about the impact of joint liability. This is not
a novel proposition. For example in Kaeo v. Davis,22' the Hawaii Supreme
Court noted in an automobile accident case that,
We believe the trial court, if requested and when appropriate should
inform the jury of the possible legal consequence of a verdict
apportioning negligence among joint tortfeasors. An explanation of
the operation of the doctrine of joint and several liability in that
situation would be consistent with our directive in HRCP 49(a) that
"[t]he court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction
concerning the matter... submitted as may be necessary to enable
the jury to make its findings upon each issue."
More recently, in an asbestos case in Alameda County, Horr v. Allied
Packing,2 22 Judge Stephen Allen Dombrink provided the jury with an
explanation of how economic damages are applied in a joint and several
manner in contrast to non-economic damages:
The question comes up why economic damages are treated
differently from economic damages. You may wonder why do we
ask you to separate the two. Each defendant that is found liable will
be held responsible for the total amount of the economic damages
that the jury awards. All right. But as to non-economic damages,
each defendant is responsible only for the percentage of the total
that the jury finds is justified by the evidence. So that's the
difference, and that's why we need to have the amounts
separately.223

221. 719 P.2d 387, 396 (Haw. 1986). See also Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 743
P.2d 61, 64-65 (Idaho 1987); DeCelles v. State, 795 P.2d 419 (Mont. 1990); Reese v. Werts Corp.,
379 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1985); Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883, 884-86 (Wyo. 1987).
222.
No. RG-03-104401 (Alameda County Sup. Ct., July 1, 2003). See also Mikul v. Bondex
International Case No. BC332247 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct., November 22, 2006).
If you find a Defendant liable for any percentage of fault, that defendant will be
responsible to pay for its proportionate share of any noneconomic damages you may
award. With respect to economic damages, that defendant will be responsible for the full
amount of those damages, less a proportionate share of any settlements that may have
been made by other Defendants.
Id.
223. Mikul v. Bondex International Case No. BC332247 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct.,
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If jurors are not advised of the legal consequences of joint and several
liability for economic damages, a compelling argument can be made that the
legal outcome of a given verdict is flatly at odds with their intent. Given the
general trend towards giving the contemporary jury a stronger understanding
of its decisions, the legal principles attendant to those decisions, and the
legal effect of their determinations and conclusions, the time has come for
all California courts to advise jurors regarding the operation of joint liability
for economic damages.224
VI. SETTLEMENT CREDITS: AVOIDING MANIPULATION OF SETTLEMENTS TO
REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF SET-OFFS FOR REMAINING DEFENDANTS

California Code of Civil Procedure § 877 provides that when a plaintiff,
acting in good faith, gives a release or dismissal to one of two or more
alleged joint tortfeasors, that release operates to reduce the claims against
the remaining alleged joint tortfeasors in the amount stipulated by the release
or the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater.2 25 In
cases applying Proposition 51, however, the 226
settlement set-off is applied
only against the plaintiffs economic damages.
For example in Hoeffer v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,227 the jury found
that 5% of plaintiffs harm was caused by defendant Rockwell, 3% by the
Navy and 6% by "all others. '228 The jury had awarded $2,999,543 to the
plaintiff, which was comprised of $599,543 in economic damages and
$2,400,000 in non-economic damages. 229 Rockwell had a judgment entered
against it for $720,000 which represented the $600,000 in economic
damages plus $120,000 in non-economic damages (5%
of the
$2,400,000).20 Thus, although Rockwell was only found to be minimally
liable, the company was actually responsible for almost one-quarter of the
total verdict. In order to offset this obvious inequity, defendants can look to
set-offs from prior settlements to reduce the economic damages.

November 22, 2006); Transcript of Proceedings at 123, Feb. 15, 2006.
224. Another approach would be for the California courts to abolish joint liability in asbestos
cases. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc
Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203 (2003).
225. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 2004).
226. Greathouse v. Ameord, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 564 (Ct. App. 1995).
227. 2006 WL 185479 *1 (S.F. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2006) (unpublished).
228. Id. at *3.
229. See id.
230. See id.
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Set-offs are calculated using the formulas set forth in Greathouse v.
In Greathouse, plaintiffs
settled with nineteen of twenty defendants for a total of $284,000.233 The
jury awarded plaintiff $289,174.10 in economic damages and $100,000 in
non-economic damages with the jury assigning 2% of the fault to the
remaining defendant Amcord, and another 2% of liability was assessed to
the plaintiff himself.234 As a result, 74.3% of the total verdict went to
economic damages and 25.7% to non-economic damages. In a post-trial
motion, Riverside was granted a set-off of only $56,800, leaving it
responsible for $232,374.10 of the economic damages. 235 This paltry set-off
represented less than 20% of the actual settlements received and was based
solely on the allocations provided in the plaintiffs settlement agreements
between economic and non-economic damages. 236 The Greathouse court
held that Amcord's share of economic damages was actually only
$72,364.42 (a savings of $160,009.98),237 which was calculated by reducing
the total economic damages of $289,174.10 by the percentage fault
attributed to the plaintiff, then this remaining total is multiplied by the
percentage of economic liability found by the jury, namely 74.3%. This
relatively straightforward calculus, however, can be manipulated by
plaintiffs' attorneys to reduce available set-offs.
In order to maximize their recovery against a non-settling defendant,
plaintiffs shift or allocate settlement payments to reduce the amount of setoffs for remaining defendants by: (1) arguing that the percentages
apportioned in the settling defendants' releases control the allocation of setoffs; (2) excluding settlement monies apportioned to the prospective
wrongful death action; (3) including a loss of consortium award in the total
damages calculation used to determine the ratio of economic to noneconomic damages; (4) failing to disclose all settlements; and (5)
undervaluing the settlement value for a case that was resolved through a
"matrix" agreement, sliding scale, or group settlement for multiple cases.
Amcord, Inc.23 and Espinoza v. Machonga.232

A.

Using Releases to ControlSettlement Apportionment

Plaintiffs frequently maintain that the apportionments found within their
settlement and release agreements should control when calculating set-offs
for non-settling defendants. These releases recite the terms of the settlement
and frequently provide an apportionment of the settlement between the
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

920

41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1995).
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992).
Greathouse,41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 564.
See id. at 566 n.3.
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personal injury action, loss of consortium claim, and any future wrongful
death action.
For example, a plaintiff may assert an allocation of 60/20/20 (meaning
60% of the settlement is attributed to the personal injury action, 20% to loss
of consortium, and 20% to future wrongful death claims), which would
automatically diminish the available set-offs by 40%. This 40% represents
the monies allocated to the loss of consortium claim and the heirs' potential
wrongful death suit. Plaintiffs' counsel might allocate as much as possible
to the loss of consortium and a future wrongful death claim, because any
monies so allocated cannot be used as a set-off.
California courts, however, do not allow plaintiffs to choose their own
apportionment of percentages. When calculating the defendant's credit for
pretrial settlements, the court must use the jury's allocation rather than that
specified in prior settlement agreements. 238 The courts have reasoned that
allocating settlements "in the manner
suggested by plaintiffs would 'subvert
239
the findings of the trier of fact.'
Where the jury has established a breakdown after reasoned review of the
evidence, its apportionment cannot be ignored in favor of plaintiffs
determination.240

In Wilson v. John Crane, Inc.,241 the court of appeals

recognized that the plaintiffs have "an interest in allocating as little as
possible" of the settlements, because the smaller the allocation, "the less the
non-settling defendants can claim as a credit."2 42 Wilson emphasized the
importance of evaluating an allocation for reasonableness. Thus, when a
defendant has gone to trial, and been subject to a finding of liability, it must
be sure the jury's allocation of liability is used to determine settlement
credits, as opposed to what may be a self-serving allocation
set forth in the
243
plaintiffs release agreements with settling defendants.
B. Allocating Settlement Monies to Prospective Wrongful Death Actions

In an effort to reduce set-offs, plaintiffs' counsel sometimes argue that
funds allocated to future wrongful death claims should not be included in the
calculation of settlement credits. Traditionally, reducing set-offs for monies

238. See Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
239. Seeid. at 158.
240. See id. Allocations of settlement credits are not based on the settlement allocations found in
releases, unless the releases have been approved following an application for good-faith settlement.
241. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240 (Ct. App. 2000).
242. See id. at 254.
243. See id. ("[T]he allocation of the settlement proceeds according to the proportions recited in a
pretrial settlement agreement is inherently suspect.").

allocated to wrongful death damages has been denied. The court of appeal,
however, has carved out an exception to that general principle, stating that
"if the present judgment included an award for wrongful death damages, we
would have no difficulty in holding that the trial court erred by excluding
that portion of the settlements from its calculation of the credit against the
judgment.", 244 In short, the court has allowed for a limited exception where
the jury has heard evidence regarding the number of heirs and their
relationship to the prospective decedent and has apportioned part of the
verdict to future wrongful death claims accordingly.
Where a jury does not make any finding as to the value of a potential
loss of consortium claim, a trial court can refuse to allocate any portion of
the prior settlements to a potential wrongful death action.145 Trial courts
have wide discretion in allocating prior settlement recoveries when they
have not been adjudicated at trial, 46
In fact, any apportionment of the prior settlements to the prospective
wrongful death claim cannot exceed a reasonable assessment of its
"ballpark" value. 247 The court must take into consideration whether the
plaintiff has a spouse or heirs, the age and independence of the heirs,
evidence of the closeness of the family, and the presence or absence of any
substantial economic damages available in the prospective wrongful death
case. A court might determine that the value of any wrongful death case will
be greatly increased by the amount of economic damages available based
upon the age of the decedent at death and any projected lost earning
capacity. The court must take into account the fact that when a plaintiff
elects to receive his economic damages in the underlying personal injury
action, any subsequent claim for wrongful death will rarely, if ever, result in
a verdict exceeding the personal injury recovery. While a potential wrongful
death claim may have some value, the value typically cannot reasonably and
fairly be estimated as greater than the value of the present personal injury
claim, and should be estimated at far less than the value of the present case.
Thus, the requirement that the prospective wrongful death claim not exceed
its ballpark value serves as another tool to protect set-offs post-judgment by
ensuring that the value of such a claim is not artificially inflated.
C. Inclusion of Loss of Consortium Award in Total Damages
Any loss of consortium damages/settlements are to be excluded from
calculation of settlement credits.248 According to the court of appeal, all

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 252 n.15.
Jones, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 156.
See Hackett v. John Crane, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 667 (Ct. App. 2002).
See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 698 P.2d 159, 163 (Cal. 1985).
Espinoza v. Machonda, II Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 503-04 (Ct. App. 1992).
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damages for loss of consortium must be excluded entirely from the Espinoza
calculus. 249 This means that the loss of consortium damages must be
subtracted from the total damages awarded prior to calculating set-offs.
Dividing the resulting number by the total damages yields a percentage.
This percentage is the percentage of settlement monies that can be applied
as set-offs.
It is a well-settled principle that loss of consortium damages cannot be
included when calculating total damages, but plaintiffs may, wittingly or
unwittingly, include this amount in their calculations." 0 The effect of
including loss of consortium awards in total damages prior to determining
the ratio of economic to total damages is a potential windfall for the
plaintiffs. This is best illustrated by an example: If a jury entered a verdict
of $3 million against a defendant made up of $1 million in economic
damages and $2 million in non-economic damages ($500,000 of which
represents loss of consortium), in order to properly calculate settlement
credits, the plaintiffs must subtract $500,000 from the judgment of $2
million. Once the loss of consortium damages are removed, the total
damages of $1.5 million is divided by the economic damages of $1 million.
This would result in a percentage of 66.6%. If the $500,000 were not
subtracted, the resulting percentage would only be 50%. These percentages
are significant because they represent the percentage of settlement monies
that may be allocated to the economic damages. Any defendant would
certainly prefer to allocate 66% of the settlement monies, as opposed to
50%, as it could be the difference between hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of dollars. Steps need to be taken to ensure that loss of consortium
damages are subtracted prior to calculating the ratio of economic to noneconomic damages.
D. Failure to DiscloseAll Settlements
At the time set-offs are determined, a defendant may discover that
plaintiffs have "agreed to agree" on settlement with various defendants or
have entered into "informal" settlements with non-parties and bankrupt
companies who were never named as defendants and who may be, in fact,
wholly unknown to the non-settling defendant. Non-disclosure of
settlements is perhaps the most insidious way to reduce set-offs. Unearthing
all potential settlements is crucial to obtaining maximum set-offs.

249. See Wilson, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253.
250. See id.

Each defendant has a "palpable financial interest" in this information, a
fact recognized by the court of appeal:
Each prejudgment settlement affects the ultimate expense borne by
each judgment debtor. Absent a prejudgment settlement, all
defendants found liable would share pro rata, that is, equally. By
settling before verdict, one defendant may acquit himself by
contributing something less than his equal share, leaving the other
defendants saddled with the entire judgment less pro tanto credit for
the settlement. The cheaper the settlement, the smaller the pro tanto
credit. Thus, a non-negotiating defendant has a palpable financial
25
interest in the amount at which the negotiating defendant settles. '
Thus, to ensure that maximum set-offs are obtained, defendants must
vigorously pursue discovery of all settlements, both those which have been
finalized and those which remain inchoate, such as the "agreement to agree"
on settlement variety.
E. Understatingthe Settlement Value of a Case by Using Matrices,Sliding
Scales or Group Settlements

Another way to shift monies and reduce set-offs is through the use of
matrices, sliding scale recovery agreements, or group settlements between
frequently sued defendants and plaintiffs' counsel. These "matrices," which
allow some defendants to standardize, and in some cases lower, settlement
values for cases, could be harmful to non-settling defendants to the extent
the "matrix value" does not reflect a fair and reasonable evaluation of the
liability in each individual case. Matrices set a dollar value for a type of
case, in many cases irrespective of the level of culpability of the particular
defendant.
Sliding scale recovery agreements, whereby the recovery against a
settling tortfeasor is dependent upon the amount that the plaintiff recovers
from non-settling defendants, is equally damaging. A settling defendant's
portion may be substantially lowered as other defendants are pursued and
charged with "picking up the slack." Sliding scale recovery agreements may
be admissible at trial to the extent necessary to inform the jury of the biased
testimony of the plaintiff and the settling parties' witnesses.
This also
could be relevant where an expert for a settling defendant testifies on behalf
of plaintiffs at trial.
Group settlements often involve one oft-sued defendant and many
individual cases in which a "group settlement" is reached. It is left to the
plaintiff's counsel to apportion the funds among their clients.
251. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 167 (Ct. App. 1972).
252. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 2004).
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In the cases of matrices, sliding scale or group settlements, a nonsettling defendant must stress to the court that an analysis of the releases is
necessary to determine if the figures accurately reflect the bargained-for
agreement between plaintiffs and the settling party, or if the figures were
arrived at by plaintiffs' counsel alone. This step is necessary to protect a
non-settling defendant from the possibility of collusion or simply an undervaluation of a given case.53
A defendant's recourse against such potential abuse is built into the
California Code of Civil Procedure. California courts require that prior
settlements employ a threshold test of "good faith" in making their
determination of the proper allocation between a personal injury case and a
prospective wrongful death case not yet filed. 5 The party seeking to rely
on the allocation "must explain to the court and to all other parties, by
declaration or other written form, the evidentiary basis for any allocations
and valuations made, and must demonstrate that the allocation was reached
in a sufficiently adversarial manner
to justify the presumption that a
255
reasonable valuation was reached.
Paying close attention to calculation of settlement credits can help those
defendants who elect to go to trial to achieve substantial set-offs should they
suffer the misfortune of an adverse outcome. Indeed, it may well make
sense to provide set-off information to remaining defendants priorto trial so
that the parties will be in a better position to assess whether trial makes
sense. This approach also would save judicial resources.
VII. CONCLUSION

Absent a state or federal legislative solution that addresses the burden on
the judicial system created by asbestos cases, the public, the parties to
asbestos litigation and the judicial system would be well served if California
courts were to focus their attention on issues discussed in this Article and
other creative approaches so that California asbestos claims can be handled
in a more sensible and just manner.

253. See Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 741 P.2d 124, 133 (Cal. 1987).
254. See Erreca's v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 167 (Ct. App. 1993). In Knox v. County of

Los Angeles, 167 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (Ct. App. 1980), the court pointed out that "[t]he statutory
requirement of good faith extends not only to the amount of the overall settlement but as well to any
allocation which operates to exclude any portion of the settlement from the set off."
255. See Erreca 's, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
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